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MCCULLOCH AND THE AMERICAN REGIME 
Mark A. Graber* 
Professor David S. Schwartz’s magnificent The Spirit of the 
Constitution: John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of 
McCulloch v. Maryland1 explicitly challenges how we teach gov-
ernment powers in first weeks or semester of constitutional law 
and implicitly challenges how we teach civil rights and liberties 
in later weeks or second semester of constitutional law.2  Contrary 
to the impression given in many classes on the constitutional law 
of national powers,3 no straight line exists from the Marshall 
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland to the New Deal and beyond.  
Schwartz meticulously details how, for two-hundred years, dif-
ferent aspects of McCulloch have been used, abused, or ignored 
in light of the dominant constitutional ethos of the time.  Both 
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 
National Federation of Independent Businesses4 claimed to be 
Marshallian, even as they offered constitutional visions that 
sharply diverged from each other and almost as sharply diverged 
from that of the McCulloch opinion.5  Professor Schwartz’s his-
tory of McCulloch subverts the common decision to discuss gov-
ernment powers in the first part or semester of constitutional law 
* Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.  Thanks to Mark
Killenbeck for the opportunity to write and David Schwartz for writing a wonderful book. 
1. DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND 
THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (2019). 
2. Some law schools require a two-semester constitutional law sequence.  Others re-
quire one, typically four-hour, constitutional law class.  The vast majority of these constitu-
tional law classes use casebooks whose initial chapters discuss the constitutional law of 
structures/powers and later chapters discuss the constitutional law of rights/liberties. See, 
e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2020); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET 
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2005); NOAH R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (20th ed. 2019).
3. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2 (moving immediately from McCulloch to National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius). 
4. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
5. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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and fundamental rights in the second part or semester of constitu-
tional law.  The Spirit of the Constitution highlights how McCul-
loch is central to questions of slavery and race that often form the 
bulk of the second part or semester of constitutional law.6  For 
most of the nineteenth century, government power was the crucial 
instrument for ensuring that Americans enjoyed certain funda-
mental rights.  Interpretations of McCulloch determined the scope 
of that national power.  Progressives turned to McCulloch in the 
1960s for the government powers necessary to combat Jim Crow.  
If strengthening national legislatures ought to be central to pro-
gressive efforts to turn back right-wing populist movements 
throughout the universe of constitutional democracy,7 then 
McCulloch ought to be as canonical a decision for the constitu-
tional politics of fundamental rights as that decision is for the con-
stitutional politics of government powers. 
A. The Constitutional Law of Structures/Powers Story
The Spirit of the Constitution is primarily devoted to the 
checkered history of McCulloch as a precedent for broad govern-
ment powers.  Schwartz points out that McCulloch when initially 
decided was an expression of “defensive” constitutional national-
ism8 that largely failed.9  John Marshall and the Federalist/Na-
tional Republican majority on the Court sought to provide consti-
tutional foundations for National Republican legislative projects 
that were under attack from the Old Republicans who later be-
came core members of the Jacksonian Democratic coalition.10  
McCulloch may have won the battle in 1819, but the antebellum 
opponents of broad interpretation of federal powers won the war.  
By the 1840s, Henry Clay’s American System was in shambles.  
Numerous efforts in Congress to incorporate a national bank, 
sponsor internal improvements, and promote domestic industry 
6. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
7. See Mark A. Graber, What’s in Crisis? The Postwar Constitutional Paradigm,
Transformative Constitutionalism, and the Fate of Constitutional Democracy, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 665, 668 (Mark A. Graber et al.,  eds., 2018). 
8. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 5.
9. Id. at 87-110.
10. See generally Michael J. Klarman, How Great were the “Great” Marshall Court
Decisions, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2001); Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: 
The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 229 (1998). 
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through protective tariffs either failed to pass the national legisla-
ture or were vetoed by Jacksonian presidents.11  Abraham Lincoln 
during the debates with Stephen Douglas proclaimed that these 
precedents constitutionally settled that the federal government 
had no power to incorporate a national bank.12   
McCulloch became a permanent presence in the American 
constitutional law of national powers only during the late New 
Deal when liberal justices committed to the administrative state 
repeatedly invoked that decision and Gibbons v. Ogden13 in opin-
ions sustaining federal legislation.  The common claim that 
“McCulloch ‘laid the foundations for the modern welfare state’ 
. . . may not reflect the intentions of the Marshall Court,” 
Schwartz notes, “but there is little doubt that McCulloch came to 
be interpreted this way.”14  McCulloch played a crucial role in the 
two most important cases that signaled the arrival of the New Deal 
commerce clause.  United States v. Darby15 cited McCulloch for 
two crucial propositions when obliterating the line between fed-
eral and state power that had structured the constitutional law of 
11. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Messages, in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 483-93 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897) (no power to finance 
local improvements) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS]; id. at 576-91 (no power to es-
tablish a national bank); John Tyler, Veto Message, in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 63-71 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897) (no power to in-
corporate a bank); id. 330-33 (no power to improve navigation of rivers); James K. Polk, 
Veto Messages, in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 
460-66 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897) (no power to construct local improvements); id. at
610-26 (no power to construct local improvements); Franklin Pierce, Veto Messages, in 5 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 247-56 (James D. Rich-
ardson, ed., 1897) (no power to construct hospitals for the insane); id. at 256-71 (no power
to make local improvements); id. at 386-88 (no power to make internal improvements);
James Buchanan, Veto Messages, in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS, 543-50 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897) (no power over education); id.
at 599-607 (no power to make local improvements); id. at 608-614 (no power to give public
lands away to settlers). See also Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial
Questions: Toqueville’s Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 534-35 (2004).  Jack-
sonian members of Congress also rejected national power to incorporate a bank.  See CONG.
GLOBE, 25th Cong. 1st Sess. app. 96 (1837).
12. Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1958), in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN  245, 278 (Roy P. Basler eds., 1953) (arguing 
that Jackson and the Democrats reversed McCulloch “as completely as any decision ever 
was reversed––so far as its practical operation is concerned”). 
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
14. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 213.
15. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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federal powers for over a century.  The first citation was for the 
proposition, “[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce 
. . . extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to 
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a 
legitimate end.”16  The second citation was for the proposition, 
“[f]rom the beginning and for many years the [tenth] amendment 
has been construed as not depriving the national government of 
authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power 
which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end.”17 
Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion in Wickard v. Fillburn cited 
McCulloch for the proposition, central to New Deal liberalism, 
that the “conflicts of economic interest between the regulated and 
those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system to res-
olution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible 
legislative process.”18   
McCulloch in the twenty-first century became a celebrity ci-
tation on questions of national power.19  One feature of celebrity 
citations is that the reference is famous, like Paris Hilton at the 
turn of the twenty-first century, simply for being famous.  
Schwartz points to the elements of a celebrity citation when he 
observes, 
McCulloch rarely does any real doctrinal work in modern 
Supreme Court decisions, despite the fact that it has been 
cited in over 130 opinions since 1969.  Most of the time, the 
justices used McCulloch as a symbol for a very abstract point 
or to signal the importance of the constitutional issue it was 
deciding.20 
A second feature of celebrity citations is that all parties on all 
sides of constitutional controversies cite that text as supporting 
their position.  McCulloch as such a celebrity citation was front 
and center when the Supreme Court considered the 
16. Id. at 118-19.
17. Id.  at 124; See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 219-23.
18. 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942).
19. For discussions of celebrity citations, see Mark A. Graber, The Declaration of In-
dependence and Contemporary Constitutional Pedagogy, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 509, 518-20 
(2016); Mark A. Graber, The Prince of Fame: Brown as Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939, 
943-44, 1004-13 (2008).
20. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 238.
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constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.  Chief Justice Rob-
erts was certain John Marshall was on his side.  His opinion strik-
ing down the individual mandate cited McCulloch for the propo-
sition that “the Federal Government ‘can exercise only the powers 
granted to it.’”21 Justice Ginsburg was as certain that John Mar-
shall would have been as supportive of Obamacare as he was of 
the Bank of the United States.  She cited McCulloch for the prop-
osition that “the Constitution was of necessity a ‘great outline,’ 
not a detailed blueprint.”22  As good constitutional lawyers, nei-
ther Roberts nor Ginsburg was at all perturbed by their invoking 
a turn of the nineteenth century jurist to resolve a twenty-first cen-
tury problem that jurist could never have imaged, using a twenty-
first century conceptual apparatus that jurist could not have com-
prehended. 
B. The Constitutional Law of Rights/Liberties Story
McCulloch is always present, sometimes present by absence, 
Schwartz details, when slavery and race are on the table.  The first 
debates over national power were as animated by concerns over 
federal power to regulate slavery as by concerns over the national 
bank or internal improvements.23  Southerners objected to the ap-
parently broad definitions of federal power in McCulloch and 
Gibbon v. Ogden because they feared precedents that might li-
cense the federal government to restrict the slave trade and, per-
haps, human bondage.  John Randolph famously declared that a 
Marshallian understanding of national power would give Con-
gress the power to “emancipate every slave in the United 
States.”24  James Madison objected to McCulloch in part because 
latitudinous constructions of federal authority might license fed-
eral bans on slavery in the territories.25  Such southern Federalists 
21. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 534-35 (2012) (internal cita-
tions omitted). See id. at 654 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing 
McCulloch for the proposition that the individual mandate was “not ‘consistent[ent] with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution’”).  
22. Id. at 601 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part) (internal citations omitted).
23. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 35-38, 98-99.
24. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 1308 (1856); see also JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION 
CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 313-14 (Richmond, Shepherd & Pollard 
1820). 
25. See infra note 35.
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as James Wayne performed daring feats of legal gymnastics when 
explaining why broad federal powers over commerce did not en-
tail any federal power over slavery.26 
Concerns over national power in the early republic often 
trenched on matters commonly taught in Constitutional Law II or 
in the rights and liberties portion of the single constitutional law 
course.  National Republicans and Whigs saw federal power as a 
means for advancing Protestant moral virtues and for promoting 
national commercial prosperity.27  They sought to build a national 
university and ensure school systems with particular curricula.28  
Many derived national programs promoting such social services 
as hospitals from constitutional commitments to ensuring the wel-
fare of the citizenry that constitutionalists in later periods would 
claim to be positive rights.  After calling for internal improve-
ments, a national university, an “astronomical observatory,” John 
Quincy Adams concluded his First Annual Message by claiming, 
if these powers and others enumerated in the Constitution 
may be effectually brought into action by laws promoting the 
improvement of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, 
the cultivation and encouragement of the mechanic and ele-
gant arts, the advancement of literature, and the progress of 
the sciences, ornamental and profound, to refrain from exer-
cising them for the benefit of the people themselves would 
be to hide in the earth the talent committed to our charge—
would be treachery to the most sacred of trusts.29 
For John Quincy Adams and other Whigs, national power was a 
means for promoting a particular kind of regime rather than 
simply a means for growing the economy.  Adams and his sup-
ports did not cite McCulloch when championing their vision of 
26. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 428-29 (1849) (Wayne, J., concurring).
27. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS
8-9 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed., 1979) (discussing the Whig political culture as focusing on
increasing total national wealth and as ensuring the entire society converted to Protestantism
and its values).
28. See Elizabeth Beaumont, Education and the Constitution: Defining the Contours
of Governance, Rights, and Citizenship, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 967, 970-71 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber, & Sanford Levinson eds., 
2015); see also GEORGE THOMAS, THE FOUNDERS AND THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL 
UNIVERSITY 47-48 (2015). 
29. John Quincy Adams, First Annual Message, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra
note 11, at 313-16. 
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the national powers necessary to create their Protestant regime, 
but Marshallian premises underlay the construction of that pol-
ity.30 
McCulloch moved out of the background when Americans 
debated the status of slavery in the territories.  Schwartz appreci-
ates that crucial issues in Dred Scott v. Sandford31 revolved 
around McCulloch’s understanding of “‘needful.’”32  One issue in 
Dred Scott was whether Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 2, which 
declares, “The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make 
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other 
property belonging to the United States,” authorized the national 
legislature to forbid human bondage north of the Missouri Com-
promise line.  Justice John McLean cited McCulloch for the prop-
osition that “needful rules and regulations” gave Congress the 
power to ban slavery in all American territories. “[T]he extent of 
those ‘needful regulations,’” he derived from Marshall’s opinion, 
“depends upon the direction of Congress, where the means are 
appropriate to the end, and do not conflict with any of the prohi-
bitions of the Constitution.”33 Justice Peter Daniel, advancing a 
southern understanding of “necessary,” insisted that banning slav-
ery in the territories was unconstitutional because doing so was 
not sufficiently necessary.34  Madison took this view forty years 
earlier.  In language that echoed his previous criticism of McCul-
loch,35 the former president informed a correspondent that the 
30. But see CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1376 (1871) (statement of Rep. Town-
send) (citing McCulloch as supporting a “national system of education”). 
31. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
32. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 105-07.
33. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 542 (McLean, J., dissenting); see also Id. at 614-
15 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he question whether a particular rule or regulation be needful, 
must be finally determined by Congress itself. Whether a law be needful, is a legislative or 
political, not a judicial, question. Whatever Congress deems needful is so, under the grant of 
power.”); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1162 (1858) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) 
(citing McCulloch to justify federal bans on slavery in the territories). 
34. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 491-92 (Daniel, J., concurring).
35. James Madison sets forth his criticism of McCulloch in his September 2, 1819 letter
to Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Judge Spencer Roane.  See Letter from James Madi-
son to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF 
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 359, 359-62 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973). 
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territorial clause merely gave Congress “a power to make the pro-
visions really needful or necessary for the government of set-
tlers.”36 
McCulloch in the debate over slavery in the territories in-
volved regime principles far broader than a commitment to na-
tional commercial prosperity.  Eric Foner notably details how Re-
publican opponents of slavery had a constitutional commitment 
to a free labor society.37  Congressional power created the condi-
tions under which contract would be the fundamental relationship 
between persons.  The ban on slavery in the territories was only 
one aspect of a Republican congressional program that would fa-
cilitate a west settled by farmers and others committed to a free 
labor regime.  The Republican Platform of 1860 called for a 
“complete and satisfactory homestead measure,” “river and har-
bor improvements of a national character,” and “a railroad to the 
Pacific Ocean.”38  During the Civil War, some Republicans began 
explicitly citing McCulloch as the foundation of this free labor 
regime.  As important, Republicans called for congressional leg-
islation rather than judicial decree as the vehicle for establishing 
that free labor regime.  Nowhere in the Republican Party Plat-
forms of 1856, 1860, and 1864 was any suggestion made that the 
courts were the institution primarily responsible for protecting 
rights in the promised anti-slavery polity.  
The post-Civil War amendments incorporated McCulloch’s 
understanding of national power as fundamental to the creation of 
a new American rights regime.  Schwartz details how Republi-
cans repeatedly insisted that the enforcement clauses of the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments vested Congress 
with the same powers to implement the constitutional ban on slav-
ery and guarantee of fundamental rights as John Marshall main-
tained Congress had to implement the provisions of Article I, Sec-
tion 8. 39  McCulloch was the appropriate precedent because 
36. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (Nov. 27, 1819), in 3 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 149, 
152 (1865).  Taney insisted the territorial clause was inapplicable to territories on the west 
side of the Mississippi. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 432.  
37. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 11-39 (1970).
38. Republican Party Platform of 1860, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 17,
1860), [https://perma.cc/8UYG-WEQT]. 
39. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 126-30.
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McCulloch was about the use of national power to achieve the 
fundamental regime goals.  Senator Charles Sumner of Massa-
chusetts, when championing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, cited 
McCulloch for the proposition that “the Supreme Court will not 
undertake to sit in judgment on the means employed by Congress 
in carrying out a power which exists in the Constitution.”40  Rep-
resentative James Wilson made the same argument when defend-
ing congressional power to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866.41  
Senator William Stewart of Nevada during the debates over the 
Supplemental Reconstruction Act cited McCulloch for the prop-
osition that: “If those who sustained the Union were right in their 
theory that the Constitution authorized the suppression of the re-
bellion then the language of the Constitution itself plainly author-
ized Congress to pass all necessary laws to carry into execution 
that power.”42  Representative George Hoar of Massachusetts 
pointed to McCulloch as providing congressional authority to 
pass the Civil Rights Act of 1871.43  Representative Robert S. 
Hale during the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1875 pointed 
to McCulloch as demonstrating why Congress had extensive 
power to ban race discrimination under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.44   
Republican accounts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments during the late 1860s and early 1870s suggest that 
had the framers followed practices in some constitutional democ-
racies and engrafted the post-Civil War Amendments onto the 
original Constitution,45 Article I, Section 8, which outlines the 
powers of the national legislature, rather than Article I, Section 
10, which constrains the power of state governments, would have 
been the most appropriate location.  Antislavery advocates in-
sisted that the Thirteenth Amendment obligated the national 
40. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 728 (1872).
41. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866).
42. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 929 (1868).
43. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 332 (1871).  See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. app. 202 (1871) (speech of Rep. Snyder). 
44. 3 CONG. REC. 979 (1875).
45. Different methods of engrafting constitutional amendments on to the constitution
are illustrated in Richard Albert’s book.  See RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS: MAKING, BREAKING, AND CHANGING CONSTITUTIONS 229-40 (2019). 
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legislature to adopt legislation ensuring that former slaves would 
become full citizens.  Wilson stated: 
[W]e must see to it that the man made free by the Constitu-
tion of the United States, sanctioned by the voice of the
American people, is a freeman indeed; that he can go where
he pleases, work when and for whom he pleases; that he can
sue and be sued; that he can lease and buy and sell and own
property, real and personal; that he can go into the schools
and educate himself and his children; that the rights and
guarantees of the good old common law are his, and that he
walks the earth, proud and erect in the conscious dignity of
a free man, who knows that his cabin, however humble, is
protected by the just and equal laws of his country.46
Republicans often referred to the Fourteenth Amendment as guar-
antees enforceable by national power rather than as limits or con-
straints on government officials.  Representative Robert Elliott of 
South Carolina described Section One as a “constitutional guar-
antee against inequality and discrimination by appropriate legis-
lation.”47  Republicans no doubt thought courts had some inde-
pendent role to play in implementing the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, perhaps akin to the dormant commerce 
clause, but few antislavery advocates discussed the judicial role 
during the ratification debates and debates over legislation imple-
menting the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.48 
Justice William Strong’s opinion in Ex parte Virginia spoke 
for the original conception of the post-Civil War Amendments 
when he pointed out,   
It is not said the judicial power of the general government 
shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting 
the rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said that 
branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void 
any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions.  It is the 
power of Congress which has been enlarged Congress is au-
thorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legisla-
tion.  Some legislation is contemplated to make the 
46. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1865).  See Mark A. Graber, The Second
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1372-90 (2016). 
47. 2 CONG. REC. 410 (1874). See 3 CONG. REC. app. 304 (1874) (statement of Sen.
Alcorn); 3 CONG. REC. 943 (1875) (statement of Rep. Lynch). 
48. See Graber, supra note 46, at 1371-72.
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amendments fully effective.  Whatever legislation is appro-
priate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amend-
ments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to 
the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the 
enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal 
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not 
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional 
power.49 
States could not exclude persons of color from juries because 
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 had prohibited race-
based jury selection in the jury process.50  No Republican sup-
porter of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 or federal court decision 
handed down before 1875 presumed that federal courts could for-
bid states from excluding persons of color from juries in the ab-
sence of federal legislation implementing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.51   
Free labor constitutionalism changed dramatically during 
the late nineteenth century.  Republicans in Congress and on the 
federal bench converted the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments from national powers analogous to the commerce clause 
into individual rights provisions analogous to the contracts clause.  
By the turn of the century, the Supreme Court had become the 
institution primarily responsible for implementing the post-Civil 
War Amendments.  Neither the majority nor dissenting opinion 
in Plessy v. Ferguson52 examined or even mentioned federal stat-
utory law or congressional debates when determining the consti-
tutional legality of segregation in railway cars.  The only contri-
butions the elected branches made to the jurisprudence of the 
freedom of contract instantiated by Lochner v. New York53 were 
to pass vague laws that enable judicial policymaking54 and secure 
the appointment of federal justices opposed to progressive 
49. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) (emphasis original).
50. See id. at 345; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
51. See Mark A. Graber, The Constitution of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (2020) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author). 
52. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
54. See generally GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY
AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003). 
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legislation.55  The few persons who bothered asking Congress for 
civil rights legislation were rebuffed.  The constitutional protec-
tions persons of color enjoyed before the Great Society came al-
most entirely from judicial decisions based directly on the Con-
stitution of the United States.56 
Americans partially reinvigorated the relationship between 
rights and powers during the 1960s.  Congress passed such path-
breaking legislation as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,57 the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965,58 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.59  The 
Supreme Court sustained these measures as appropriate exercises 
of federal legislative power under the Civil War Amendments.60  
The judicial supporters of these measures made ample reference 
to McCulloch.  Chief Justice Warren, when upholding the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, cited McCulloch for the proposition that the 
commerce power “extends to those activities intrastate which so 
affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Con-
gress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to 
the attainment of a legitimate end.”61  Warren in South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach, when upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
stated that Chief Justice Marshall “laid down the classic formula-
tion” for determining the exercise of national powers when
55. See generally Walter F. Murphy, In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft and
Supreme Court Appointments, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 159 (1961). 
56. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (holding persons of color may
not be excluded from pre-primary voting by private organizations closely affiliated with po-
litical parties); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 662 (1944) (holding political parties cannot 
prohibit persons of color from voting in primary elections); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 
500 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 
536, 541 (1927); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).  For exceptions, see Screws 
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
57. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.). 
58. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.). 
59. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (1968) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619). 
60. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1964);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).  The Supreme Court sustained a 
direct ancestor of the Fair Housing Act in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420-
22 (1969). 
61. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 258 (internal quotations omitted).
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sustaining the constitutionality of the national bank.62  In seven 
opinions sustaining government power to promote civil rights and 
civil liberties published between 1966 and 1970, the Supreme 
Court quoted “the celebrated words of Chief Justice Marshall in 
McCulloch v. Maryland,” ‘Let the end be legitimate, let it be 
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, 
are constitutional.’”63 
A subtle difference nevertheless exists between the constitu-
tional politics of Reconstruction and the constitutional politics of 
the Great Society.  Republicans during Reconstruction, the more 
Radical Republicans in particular, conceptualized the post-Civil 
War Amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment specifically, as de-
claring fundamental regime commitments to be implemented 
largely, if not exclusively, by Congress.64  Great Society liberals 
more often conceptualized the post-Civil War Amendments as de-
claring particular fundamental rights whose implementation was 
shared in ways not fully developed in the 1960s by the Supreme 
Court and Congress.  With rare exception, members of Congress 
and the justices focused on the constitutional power to protect in-
dividual rights, not the McCulloch power to secure the conditions 
of a particular fundamental rights regime. Congress was empow-
ered to pass legislation remedying, identifying, and preventing vi-
olations of the individual rights enumerated in the Thirteenth, 
Fourteen, and Fifteenth Amendments.65  The Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 forbade “the use of voter qualification laws where neces-
sary to meet the risk of continued or renewed violations of 
62. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.  See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (“the McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what consti-
tutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
63. Jones, 392 U.S. at 443 (internal citations omitted).  See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 143 (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 
650; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 783-84 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part); 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 276 
(Black, J., concurring); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 281 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). But see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 358 (Black, J. concurring in part) 
(claiming the above quotation in McCulloch supports limiting power to protect voting 
rights). 
64. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
65. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
108 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 73:1 
constitutional rights.”66 Congress refrained from adopting 
measures promoting voting in the absence of constitutional rights 
violations.67   
C. The Constitutional Law of Structures/Powers/
Rights/Liberties Story 
The Spirit of the Constitution suggests that constitutional 
pedagogy and development might benefit from further breaking 
down the barriers between constitutional powers and constitu-
tional rights.  Americans have historically acknowledged the re-
lationships between government structures and constitutional 
rights.  Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 1 asserted that “the 
vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty.”68 In 
Federalist 31, he declared, “all observations founded upon the 
danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and 
structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of its pow-
ers.”69 The persons responsible for the Civil War Constitution un-
derstood how a liberty regime collapsed the distinction between 
rights and powers.  Conservatives on the Roberts Court echo this 
conjunction of powers and rights when they repeatedly declare 
that federalism is a vital protection for liberty,70 although how in 
their opinions state rights promote freedom seems obscure to 
many progressives.71  Progressives are often less sensitive to po-
tential relationships between Article I, Section 8 and the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Jesse Choper suggests the Supreme Court 
should focus exclusively on individual rights, treating questions 
66. S. REP. NO. 89-162, pt. 3, at 19 (1965).
67. One might compare H.R.1—For the People Act of 2019, 116th Congress, which
after declaring “It is the policy of the United States that . . . all eligible citizens of the United 
States should access and exercise their constitutional right to vote in a free, fair, and timely 
manner” outlines such policies as same day registration that promote voting, even though 
not designed to remedy, identify, or prevent constitutional violations.  For the People Act of 
2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019), [https://perma.cc/6F2W-PF9U].
68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 196 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). 
70. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012) (quoting New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)) (“federalism secures to citizens the liberties 
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power”) (internal quotations omitted); Bond v. 
United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011) (“the individual liberty secured by federalism”).  
71. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 595 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part).
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of government powers as non-justiciable.72 A constitutional law 
class that begins by exploring McCulloch in the context of Fed-
eralist 1, Federalist 31, and the post-Civil War Amendments 
might provide foundations for a better constitutional law and pol-
itics that harnesses national power for human freedom as well as 
for material prosperity. 
Professor Schwartz provides constitutional Civil War buffs 
who identify with radical Republicans some cause for optimism.  
The meaning and significance of McCulloch, he points out, has 
changed as American constitutional commitments have 
changed.73  Our McCulloch is not the McCulloch of 1819, 1869, 
1919, or 1969.  Perhaps inspired by creative reinterpretations of 
McCulloch throughout history, progressive pedagogues will find 
ways to teach their students how theories of national power lay at 
the foundations of all fundamental rights regimes and progres-
sives activists will construct a congressionally led constitutional 
politics that recognizes a strong national government to be the 
prerequisite of a strong progressive fundamental rights regime.  
72. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980) 
73. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 248-52.
